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BACKGROUND TO THIS SUBMISSION  
  In 1998 the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and NORAD commissioned a study 
to investigate the impact of governance failures, including corruption and the 
operation of Palestinian institutions on Palestinian state formation. This was in 
the context of Norwegian aid support to the Palestinian Authority and its 
sponsorship of the Oslo Process. Three people led the research team: myself, 
based at SOAS, Dr Inge Amundsen, a political scientist based at the Christen 
Michelsen Institute (CMI) located in Bergen, Norway, and Dr George 
Giacaman, a Palestinian sociologist based at Muwatin, a research institute based 
in Ramallah in Palestine. A further eight researchers were part of the team, from 
the CMI and SOAS, but mostly commissioned from Palestinian universities by 
Muwatin, in Palestine. The project became a wide-ranging investigation of the 
constraints facing state formation in Palestine and the team kept working until 
2002. The report has taken the shape of a book that is being published by 
Routledge early next year. 
SUMMARY  
  The Oslo Agreement intended to set up a Palestinian client state; the evidence 
suggests that both sides broadly accepted the limits of this state, even though 
neither would refer to it as a client state for obvious reasons. Israel's insistence 
on a client state was driven by its security concerns, but it could only be made 
effective either by creating incentives for compliance through economic 
integration or severe penalties for non-compliance through asymmetric controls 
over the Palestinian economy. Israel started with the former objective in its 
declarations but its actions very soon could only be described as consistent with 
the latter. We argue that this can in turn be explained by Israel's demographic 
concerns with economic integration. We argue that many of the governance 
failures of the Palestinian Authority can be explained in terms of the design 
features of the Oslo Agreement. Other apparent failures were paradoxically 
developmental interventions that successfully attracted overseas Palestinian 
investors by offering them non-transparent benefits in a context of great 
uncertainty. A third category of governance failures reflected genuine failures of 
the Authority. Our analysis directs attention to features of Palestinian 
governance that need attention in the future, but also points to the importance of 
external donors having a clear idea of what a viable Palestinian state would 
require before they engage in conflict resolution. This was missing in Oslo, and 
is particularly important now that Israel seems to have adopted a 
"bantustanisation" strategy that is likely to create lasting problems for a two-
state solution, and which is ironically not in Israel's interests either. 
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  
  The Palestinian Authority was not a state, and lacked many of the critical 
powers of a state. It did not have control over its borders, currency, fiscal or 
monetary policy, natural resources, or foreign policy, it did not determine 
citizenship, and much of its trade was with or through Israel and regulated 
tightly by the Paris Economic Protocol. On the other hand, it was somewhat 
more than a municipal government. It had policing and security powers over 
Palestinians, and most Palestinians recognised its exercise of lethal force over 
themselves as legitimate. Its leaders also had access to budgetary (and off-
budget) resources, which were used for political accommodation and 
stabilisation within the Palestinian polity, and this gave it a state-like quality. 
And despite the absence of any formal powers to determine property rights, its 
leaders had the political legitimacy to sign economic "contracts" with overseas 
Palestinian investors with sufficient credibility to encourage many of them to 
invest in a context of great uncertainty. These characteristics meant that any 
analysis of governance would have to take into account the specific context in 
which Palestinian state formation was happening. In particular, the Authority 
had a number of contradictory state characteristics in incipient form, and we 
wanted to identify the internal and external conditions that would encourage the 
further development of particular combinations of characteristics.  
  A further complication for assessing performance is that the Palestinian 
economy was highly dependent on the Israeli one. Part of this was a natural 
dependence given the much greater degree of capitalist development in Israel 
and the availability of labour market opportunities there, but part of it was an 
engineered dependence, based on artificial controls over trade, investments, 
fiscal space, and of course, restrictions of movement within the Palestinian 
territories through settlements and checkpoints. As a result, the Palestinian 
economy was hugely dependent on the performance of the Israeli economy, and 
more importantly, it could be made to suffer if Israel took particular actions like 
limiting the flow of labour to Israel or cutting off parts of the Palestinian 
territories from each other. 
  The following table shows that as soon as Oslo was signed, the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of the Palestinian territories collapsed, and this was 
largely because Israel imposed new "border controls" between Israel and the 
Palestinian territories, and within the Palestinian territories. The fall in Gross 
National Income (GNI), which includes labour remittances, was thus even more 
severe than the fall in GDP. This relationship between GNI and GDP is a 
persistent feature of the Palestinian economy and is an index of its dependence 
on labour flows to Israel. This can be seen in the first two rows of the table. In 
downturns, GNI falls more than GDP, and in upturns, it rises by more. 
  After the first two years of adjustment, GNI strongly recovered. This was 
because labour was once again allowed into Israel, but now in the context of a 
system of controls that could be used to stop movements at short notice. But 
what is more interesting is that growth of GDP shot up as well. Unfortunately, 
this round of the state-formation exercise abruptly ended in 2000. The figures 
for the succeeding period are being constantly revised downwards and are less 
trustworthy, but there is no question that the Palestinian economy has been 
destroyed during the second intifada. We can explain the growth spurt from 
1996 to 1999, and in particular the strong GDP growth, in terms of the strong 
recovery in private sector investment, as shown in the third row of the table. 
Since the local Palestinian private sector consisted largely of small and low 
technology artisans and farmers, this private investment boom was driven by 
incoming investments of overseas Palestinians who began to invest in the 
tourism sector, in telecommunications and in related service sectors. Those who 
visited Ramallah or Bethlehem over this period could not have failed to notice 
the large number of quite decent hotels that were springing up almost overnight. 
This story, we believe, has not been adequately told or understood, and it 
provides a glimpse of what the Palestinian economy could have achieved under 
different external conditions.  
  Also interesting is the fact that aid as a share of GDP was on a persistent 
downward trend throughout this period. The main impact of this was on public 
investment that began to decline from 1997 onwards, as shown in the fourth row 
of our table. While this was undesirable given the weakness of public 
infrastructure and the political instability of the times, the growth figures also 
show that the Palestinian territories are not necessarily heavily aid dependent, 
and that considerable autonomous economic development is potentially possible 
if expatriate Palestinian capitalists can be harnessed to play a role in developing 
the Palestinian economy. 
PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC TRENDS DURING THE OSLO PERIOD 
 1994 1995 1996 1997  1998 1999 2000 
(p) 
Real GDP Growth 8.5 -2.4  -3.2 4.8 7.0  6.0 -1.5 
Real GNI Growth 0.9 -4.3  -4.6 7.6 11.9  7.2 -4.9 
Real Private Fixed Investment Growth na  5.0 -5.0 5.0  11.3 19.0 -12.2  
Real Public Fixed Investment Growth na  10.0 15.0 20.0  -3.0 -13.0 -17.1  
Aid as Proportion of GDP(%) 18.0  17.6 15.0 14.0  10.0 10.0 na  
Unemployment Rate 14.8 18.2 23.8 20.6  13.2 11.8 14.1  
        
 
  We analysed the Palestinian Authority and its different, and sometimes 
contradictory governance characteristics in the context of its specific economic 
and political environment. Given the transitional nature of the Authority, we 
could only look for incipient characteristics whose further development might 
define different "types" of state, and we looked for the institutional, political 
and external conditions that sustained these characteristics and/or could lead to 
their change or further consolidation. Not surprisingly, we found elements of 
institutional and political characteristics that could potentially support very 
different types of states, defined in terms of their economic and political 
features. The further development of these features would depend on how 
political and institutional conditions developed. For convenience, we refer to 
these possibilities as a client state, a predatory state, a fragmented clientelist 
state, and a developmental state. 
CLIENT STATE CHARACTERISTICS  
  Many of the characteristics of the Palestinian Authority could be described as 
characteristics of a client state (of Israel). This was reflected in the agreements 
the PLO signed at Oslo, in the Paris Protocol, and other treaties. These allowed 
Israel not only to restrict the defence capacities of the PA, but also to determine 
its international trade, ensure its fiscal dependence on taxes collected from 
Palestinians by Israel, control its international borders and internal checkpoints 
for an indefinite period, and so on. The political imperatives that forced the 
PLO to this route are well known, and follow from Israel's insistence on 
"security-first", namely that until Israel is assured of its security, it will insist on 
retaining sovereign powers within the Palestinian territories. This condition was 
understood and implicitly accepted by the Palestinian leadership and a 
considerable coalition of interests within the West Bank and Gaza that provided 
the constituency for Arafat's programme. 
  However, while the principle was widely accepted, compliance by a client 
state can be ensured through very different strategies, and we find that Israel's 
contradictory strategy after Oslo contributed to make progress unviable. This 
incoherence in Israeli strategies is likely to block progress under the new Road 
Map. We distinguish between two types of strategies that could ensure that a 
Palestinian client state remained compliant with the security interests of Israel. 
The first can be described as an integrationist strategy. This would involve a 
gradual but progressive opening up of capital and labour markets, such that the 
economic interests of the two states become convergent, and incentives were 
created that would prevent actions by the client state against the interests of the 
dominant power. This strategy was outlined by Peres in his book The New 
Middle East and some moves were made in this direction in the form of joint 
Israeli-Palestinian investments (for example, the Jericho casino, Israeli 
investments in some Palestinian companies, and some Israeli subcontracting to 
Palestinian companies in the Gaza strip). Potentially, economic integration may 
have allowed the Palestinian economy to grow sustainably, and would have 
been economically beneficial for the Israeli economy too. However, these 
moves rapidly came to an end, and in the critical area of labour mobility, the 
moves were in the opposite direction from the outset, with significantly 
increased restrictions from the signing of Oslo onwards. We find it difficult to 
explain these restrictions in terms of security concerns alone. Although there 
were sporadic acts of violence on both sides after Oslo, these were both 
expected and actually quite limited in the early years when there was 
widespread goodwill and optimism on both sides. Integration may have 
provided significant dividends in the long term. In our opinion, the unstated 
problem that drove the closure of the integrationist route is a political rather 
than a security problem. As the EU experience shows, economic integration 
leads (sooner or later) to gradually increasing political integration and this 
threatens to defeat the purpose of the two-state solution from the Israeli 
perspective. If the Palestinian population of the territories occupied in 1967 are 
added to the Israeli Palestinians who already have political rights in Israel, the 
Jewish-non Jewish balance is already 50-50, and is likely to become 40-60 in 
the next couple of decades. If this political obstacle is going to prevent any 
meaningful progress towards economic integration in the Middle East, this has 
critically important implications for external aid and donor policies. 
  The initial moves towards integration were not followed through, and instead 
there was a rapid shift to a strategy of asymmetric containment. In contrast to 
integration, here the goal is to enforce compliance by creating huge penalties 
for non-compliance. Amongst the mechanisms that were consistent with this 
strategy were new and intrusive restrictions on the movement of labour, 
retaining control over key roads and checkpoints within the territories, the 
control of international borders and the ability to delay imports and exports, 
retaining control of Palestinian fiscal revenues and determining the timing of 
their release, and so on. By the end of the period, although economic growth 
took off, led by new external drivers, the vulnerability of the Palestinian 
economy had increased as a result of institutional changes that gave Israel the 
power to shut off the Palestinian economy at short notice; an ability that was 
demonstrated rapidly when the second intifada began. In contrast to the 
integrationist strategy, a client state strategy based on asymmetric containment 
exposes the client to perpetual economic vulnerability, and is not likely to be 
politically acceptable to a people aiming to achieve greater sovereignty. It is 
important to recognise that key features of asymmetric containment were likely 
to continue under the "final offer" that Arafat rejected at Camp David. As a 
Palestinian negotiator put it: "In a prison, the prisoners control 95% of the 
space. It is the 5% they do not control that make it a prison". 
  It is important to recognise that many of the apparent governance failures of 
the Authority were a direct consequence of the design features of the Oslo 
constitution that intended to create a client state with a strong executive with 
limited accountability. All parties recognised in 1994 that pushing through a 
two-state solution against the strong opposition of some Palestinian minorities 
would require an emphasis on security apparatuses and a strong executive. Our 
assessment is that this was not necessarily a mistake, and in terms of what the 
Authority was supposed to achieve, its initial performance in security and 
development was not bad. However, the problem was that the asymmetric 
containment version of the client state was structurally unviable in the sense that 
imposing it on the Palestinian population eventually threatened to cost too much 
in terms of the suppression of a Palestinian opposition. Far from this being a 
ploy of Arafat, an objective analysis suggests that imposing a client state with 
asymmetric containment is likely to be politically impossible for any leadership 
of the future. This conclusion too is likely to be of interest to external donors 
and the hopes that are being pinned on an eventual change of the Arafat 
leadership. If anything, a post-Arafat leadership is likely to find adherence to 
any client state strategy much more difficult. 
  Once the economy is perceived to be unviable, this has implications for the 
strategies of political players and the political leadership. Even a well-
intentioned political leadership would then be likely to descend into either a 
predatory mode, or to fragment into versions of fragmented clientelism, since it 
is not possible to seek power or wealth through economic development. 
Alternatively, depending on its opportunities, economic constraints can result in 
greater state efforts at pushing development. Characteristics of all these types of 
states could be found in embryonic form in the Palestinian Authority, and our 
project examined the conditions under which each of these combinations of 
characteristics are likely to be furthered. 
PREDATORY STATE CHARACTERISTICS  
  A predatory state is one that extracts resources from its citizens to enrich state 
officials; but at such a rate that economic growth is lowered or even made 
negative. We typically find such states in contexts where economic growth is 
difficult to trigger anyway, for instance because of social resistance, the under-
development of capitalists and the infrastructure they operate with. Many of the 
instances of petty corruption and extortion of bribes from businesses observed 
in the Palestinian Authority are consistent with a predatory state. However, 
while these issues needed to be addressed, the PA compares favourably with 
other developing countries. This is surprising given the uncertain context in 
which the Palestinian Authority operated, but it can be explained by the 
development options available to the executive. These options were not poor to 
the extent that predation became the more profitable option. Nationalism may 
also have helped, as it has in a number of East Asian countries. But most 
importantly, the availability and willingness of expatriate Palestinian capitalists 
to return to Palestine played a key role in determining better strategies for the 
political leadership. 
FRAGMENTED CLIENTELIST CHARACTERISTICS  
  Another variant of state failure is observed when competing (patron-client) 
factions within a developing country are strong but fragmented, and productive 
opportunities are limited. In this scenario, competing factions are likely to seek 
redistribution rather than policies to enhance growth. This is a very common 
scenario in developing countries, where the competing demands of powerful 
factions can serve to paralyse the state, and we describe this as fragmented 
clientelism. The large redistributive transfers made by the PA to maintain 
political stability had some characteristics of fragmented clientelism. The 
administrative structure, and the security apparatus in particular, probably 
employed more than a few people who had to be accommodated for reasons of 
political stabilisation. While these problems were real enough, the Palestinian 
Authority did not suffer from these redistributive demands to the same extent as 
many other developing countries. Not only was executive power sufficiently 
centralised to prevent redistributive demands going out of hand, Palestinian 
civil society was, paradoxically, too fragmented to allow the consolidation of 
factional parties along the lines of many developing countries that face severe 
constraints as a result of clientelism. 
DEVELOPMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS  
  Most surprising was our finding that in response to asymmetric containment, 
the PA engaged in a number of interventions that in the Palestinian context 
amounted to developmental interventions. Here, we did not apply any textbook 
notion of the conditions that encourage investment, but rather we looked at the 
evidence of developmental states in East Asia that were successful in 
encouraging investment in climates that were otherwise adverse for investors. 
Historically, this has often involved necessarily non-transparent incentives for 
investors, granting them temporary monopolies, or otherwise augmenting 
profitability to encourage investment and risk-taking, while disciplining 
investors who did not perform. The Palestinian Authority had virtually no fiscal 
powers to give incentives to investors, but it did allow the setting up of 
monopolies that enhanced profits for critical investors, granted them tax breaks 
and other incentives such as delayed payments of utility bills. It also shared 
some of the profits of these enterprises, both legally, as the Authority owned 
shares in many of these enterprises, but also illegally, in the form of kickbacks 
that augmented the off-budget resources that were vital for regime survival in a 
context of fiscal control by Israel. Critically, it showed itself able to change the 
allocation of contracts if opportunities that were more productive emerged, 
since the institutional and political conditions meant that the executive had no 
interest in knowingly tolerating inefficiency. This system cannot be described 
briefly, but while it certainly had costs and disincentives, its net effect was to 
attract vital investments by overseas Palestinians in a context of tremendous 
uncertainty in an area whose final status was not clear, and where property 
rights were ultimately controlled by Israel. These interventions had the 
appearance of governance failures but they were important for explaining the 
reasonably good economic performance in the final years of Oslo, despite a 
tightening of asymmetric containment. 
  Thus, we differentiate between three different types of governance failures 
observed in the PA. First, there were apparent governance failures that were 
directly the result of the design of the Oslo Architecture. Examples of these 
include petty corruption at border posts, since an excessive number of 
checkpoints were constructed, excessive expenditure on security and security 
personnel, and executive centralisation. These were arguably necessary costs of 
trying to construct a client state. They did have negative economic effects, but 
these failures were not in the control of the PA. It may be very difficult to 
address these governance issues within the context of a client state strategy. 
  Secondly, there was clearly a range of internal failures of the PA. These 
included instances of petty corruption by security officials, extortion by 
officials, and a centralisation of decision-making beyond what was necessary in 
the circumstances. The leadership could have addressed the negative effects of 
these failures. If a client state strategy is to be pursued in the future, attention 
should be focused in these areas. 
  But finally, there were apparent governance failures that were associated with 
the Palestinian leadership's attempt to break out of its asymmetric containment 
by pursuing developmental strategies and enhancing its own economic 
flexibility. These strategies included maintaining secret funds, promoting 
Palestinian trading monopolies as counterparts of Israeli trading monopolies, 
granting special privileges to Palestinian expatriate investors, including 
temporary monopolies, and so on. These interventions paradoxically enhanced 
the viability of PA and allowed economic development in the territories that 
was faster than might otherwise have been the case. It follows that attempting to 
change these governance characteristics without addressing asymmetric 
containment and broader issues of accelerating development may actually be 
counter-productive. This too is an important conclusion for donors and aid 
strategies.  
CONCLUSIONS  
  Oslo has been important for establishing that any external assistance for 
conflict resolution and economic development can only help if it comes with a 
clear picture of the "final status" that is to be achieved. Here final status has to 
be defined not only as territorial boundaries (which are critical for determining 
the political viability of any future Palestinian entity) but also its proposed 
economic sovereignty. The openness of Oslo with respect to a number of 
potential outcomes eventually led to its failure. The diagram below summarises 
some of the arguments we make about state characteristics and how they 
developed. The most important point to make in this brief submission is that the 
client state strategy (though it was not called that by any party for obvious 
reasons) was accepted by both sides in 1993 as the only viable way forward. 
But the Palestinian constituency behind Arafat would not accept asymmetric 
containment, and Israel would not proceed with economic integration. This 
raises a fundamental challenge for any road map of the future. There are 
unlikely to be conditions as favourable as in 1993-94 for attempting a client 
state based on economic integration, and we have provided a demographic 
explanation of why Israel rejected this route. Our analysis suggests that the only 
other possibility of constructing a two-state solution would be an immediate 
move towards a fully sovereign Palestinian state on international (1967) borders 
with no territorial exceptions. The problem of exceptions in the form of 
settlements and East Jerusalem is that a Palestinian constituency would not be 
found that was big enough to enable a viable state to be formed. If a "Green 
Line" Palestinian state could be formed, security for Israel would then have to 
be internationally guaranteed, rather than guaranteed by maintaining the 
Palestinian state in client status. Our analysis suggests that while the loss of 
employment opportunities in Israel would hurt, the presence of expatriate 
Palestinian capitalists means that even a state with PA governance 
characteristics could very soon become reasonably viable with full sovereignty 
and separation from Israel. If a Green Line state proves not to be possible, a 
demographic shift is likely to hit Israel within a couple of decades if not sooner, 
and rational Palestinians will begin to demand civil and voting rights instead of 
land. This strategy may have its own merits but was outside the remit of our 
project. 
 
  (Source: Khan, M H et al (eds) State Formation in Palestine. London: 
Routledge (forthcoming). 
  In the meantime, the post-intifada Palestinian economy has fragmented by 
design because of Israeli closures. In the interim, survival in Palestinian 
enclaves has come to depend on aid, remittances, income sharing and a return of 
the population to the land and to a more basic economy. This is clearly not a 
viable situation for too long, but Sharon's administration may hope that the 
Palestinian polity will also fragment and then it may be possible to separately 
administer Palestinian regions under regional political leaders. We describe this 
strategy as "bantustanization", and it may be that this will now continue for 
some time. It is, of course, not a permanent or viable solution, and its only 
effect will be to make the two-state solution even less likely. This is so because 
the land on which the Palestinian state can be constructed is steadily being lost, 
and the population balance is shifting to an extent that Palestinians have more to 
gain by demanding civil and voting rights instead of an unviable state. It may 
already be too late, but our analysis suggests that in any case donors have to be 
careful not to let Israel shift into a bantustanization strategy by uncritically 
allowing aid to be used to sustain unviable enclaves. Even if aid has to flow for 
humanitarian reasons, each tranche should be time-bound and its renewal 
should be an occasion for pressuring Israel to accept its responsibilities for the 
people living under its control. The analysis and case studies backing up this 
memorandum are due to be published as a book by Routledge as I have already 
indicated[253]. However, pending publication, I will be happy to provide the 
committee with further information if required. 
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